








There is a traditional consensus, easily summarized, about the Bourbon restoration’s foreign policy. 
After the lenient provisions of the first treaty of Paris in 1814, the second treaty of Paris following 
the Hundred Days was significantly harsher, stripping France of border fortresses and territories and 
imposing on her both an army of occupation and a 700 million franc indemnity. This was 
compounded by the inglorious sight of Louis XVIII returning home 'in the baggage wagons of the 
enemy.' Over the next fifteen years the restored monarchy did little to recover France's lost great-
power status. The occasions on which it tried, such as the Spanish expedition of 1823, were mere 
nuances in its pacific foreign policy. For these reasons, the Bourbons were unable to shake off their 
association with defeat and national humiliation, which contributed to their overthrow in July 1830. 
In Robert Tombs’ pithy verdict: ‘Always there faute de mieux, tepidly welcomed because they 





This article argues that the restored monarchy’s foreign policy was distinctly less passive than 
usually thought, and that its will to revise the Vienna settlement has been significantly 
underestimated. Indeed, by its last years the régime had acquired an adventurist streak that might 
even have threatened the stability of Europe had the July revolution not intervened. The story of 
how this ‘alternative’ policy had become dominant by 1828 has rarely been studied in depth. Paul 
Schroeder acknowledges it in his seminal The Transformation of European Politics, but only in the 
course of one paragraph, and the most recent history of the régime, Francis Démier’s La France de 
la restauration, passes over it in a few lines. The one detailed account comes in a German 
monograph of 1963, Karl Hammer’s Die Franzősische Diplomatie der Restauration und 
Deutschland 1814-1830. This is informative and scrupulously researched, but focuses on only one 








The process by which the Bourbon restoration moved from a cautious to a ‘forward’ foreign policy 
was complex and needs first to be understood chronologically; it developed alongside, and 
constantly interreacted with, the diplomatic and military events of the 1820s. The transition from 
one policy to another was never wholly complete, so that tensions between both remained until the 
end of the régime. Nevertheless, two broad phases are discernible. In the first, running from 1815 to 
1823, France sought to achieve her diplomatic aims strictly within the framework of the Vienna 
settlement. Then, over the next four years, this course came under increasing attack, but was 
vigorously defended by the prime minister Villèle until his fall in 1827 and the shift to a forward 
policy under the last two ministries of the restoration. 
 
The first phase corresponds most closely to the received picture. However, it is difficult to see what 
other diplomatic options Louis XVIII and his ministers had at the time. They had to contend not 
only with the second treaty of Paris, but also with the wider problem posed by the Vienna 
settlement, one of whose aims was to limit and contain France. Partly this was done by tilting the 
European balance of power decisively against her. Austria became the dominant power in northern 
Italy, and Prussia was awarded the Rhineland. This ensured that any future French expansion across 
the Alps or the Rhine would be blocked. More vulnerable states on France’s borders were also 
reinforced, with Holland gaining Belgium and Piedmont regaining Savoy. Two further factors added 
humiliation to defeat. The treaty of Paris was supplemented by the quadruple alliance between 
Russia, Britain, Austria and Prussia, signed on the same day and designed to keep France under 
close surveillance. For the French public, its most tangible, and much resented, manifestation was a 








The first aim of French statesmen after 1815 was naturally to extricate their country from what 
Emmanuel de Waresquiel and Benoît Yvert have aptly dubbed her ‘diplomatic purgatory.’
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 This was 
achieved in the autumn of 1818 by the duc de Richelieu as foreign minister, who secured at the 
congress of Aix-la-Chapelle the end of the allied occupation of France, and the reduction and then 
the complete extinction of the war indemnity. Yet France’s reintegration into the international 
system was still fragile and ambiguous. Europe was still dominated by the Quadruple Alliance, and 
France’s diplomatic and military freedom of action remained distinctly circumscribed. When in 
1820 and 1821 revolutions broke out in Italy, one of her traditional spheres of influence, the task of 
suppressing them was given not to her but to her old rival Austria.
5
 Richelieu retired from 
government, but after his departure French foreign policy became even more cautious. In the mid-
1820s the dominant minister was Villèle, whose overriding concern was France’s financial stability 




This situation began to change, however, with the successful French invasion of Spain in April 
1823. On the surface, this was entirely consistent with existing restoration diplomacy: it was 
launched to uphold the Vienna settlement, by rescuing King Ferdinand VII from a popular 
revolution. In fact, the expedition proved a turning-point, and began the transition to a very different 
foreign policy. Above all, its success proved that, eight years after its spectacular defection to 
Napoleon during the Hundred Days, the French army was now a disciplined and effective 
instrument of the regime. On the eve of the invasion, this had not appeared self-evident, but as it 
turned out, the campaign was a military promenade. The army settled doubts about its loyalty by 
dispersing at the Bidassoa a small force of French republicans and Bonapartists who urged it to 
mutiny, and in the one serious battle of the war stormed the Spanish revolutionaries’ fortress of the 
Trocadero with exemplary élan. For the first time since 1815 the essential prerequisite of an active 







The Spanish expedition also brought to the forefront of French politics the man who more than any 
other was to shape this forward policy, François-René, vicomte de Chateaubriand.
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 There are few if 
any other examples in modern history of such an important intellectual and cultural figure also 
being a leading politician. As a great writer and poet, author of Le Génie du Christianisme and 
René, and one of the founders of European Romanticism, Chateaubriand remains a major figure in 
modern literature. Yet for most of the restoration he was also a front-rank political figure, as a peer 
of France, ambassador to Berlin, London and Rome, plenipotentiary to the congress of Verona and, 
in 1823-24, foreign minister.
9
 There is little doubt that his ambitions went further than this, and that 
his ultimate aim was to become prime minister. Had he managed to regain the foreign ministry in 
the late 1820s – and he made several efforts to do so – this would have made him the dominant 
figure in the government. 
 
Chateaubriand also had a comprehensive, if grandiloquent, vision of the future of the restored 
monarchy both in domestic and foreign policy. He described it succinctly, with characteristic lack of 
modesty, in the Mémoires d’outre-tombe: ‘I was not insensible to the idea that I could give my 
country liberty at home and independence abroad.’
10
 Chateaubriand’s championship of ‘liberty’ was 
a major theme of his writings, and is well-known. It was expressed in his campaign for press 
freedom throughout the restoration and, in works like De la monarchie selon la charte, his 
advocacy of a representative monarchy as the best means of healing the wounds of the Revolution. 
In contrast, his key foreign policy objective, ‘independence’, is less familiar. This is partly because 
Chateaubriand the author has always eclipsed Chateaubriand the statesman, but also because its 




This concept had a long history. Julius Caesar in his Gallic Wars had first stated that ancient Gaul 
had originally extended to the Rhine, the Alps, the Atlantic and the Pyrenees. The French state that 




XIV had dreamed of returning to them remains controversial. The Revolution, however, brought the 
‘natural frontiers’ to the forefront of national rhetoric. Its most famous expression came in Danton’s 
speech to the Convention of 31
st
 January 1793: ‘The limits of France are marked out by nature. We 
shall attain them at each of their four points: at the Ocean, the Rhine, the Alps and the Pyrenees.’ 
After immense efforts these frontiers had been gained by 1801, then extended by Napoleon, before 




In the era of the Vienna settlement, with its deep suspicion and careful quarantining of France, it 
seems extraordinary that any politician could have dreamed of extending her borders once more to 
the limits conquered by the Revolution. This is certainly the view of those historians who have 
mentioned it: Schroeder dismisses it as ‘absurd more than dangerous’, while for Jardin and Tudesq 
it was merely a ‘mirage.’
13
 In fact, it was not quite as implausible as generally thought, particularly 
in the later 1820s. Its real attraction, however, was as much domestic as diplomatic. This lay in the 
support it was assumed to enjoy in public opinion. Regaining even part of the natural frontiers 
would enormously strengthen the régime by associating it with two of the most powerful legacies of 
the Revolution, territorial expansion and military glory. This, Chateaubriand and his followers were 
convinced, was the key to achieving their goal of a popular, patriotic monarchy restored to the ranks 
of the great powers. 
 
Just how far the French public did support this policy is difficult to gauge. Public opinion had been 
recognized as a major political force since the late eighteenth century, but measuring and 
interpreting it was still in its infancy.
14
 Indeed, one aspect of the Bourbon restoration marked a step 
backwards from what progress had been made. The detailed monthly reports on ‘esprit public’ 
required from the prefects in each department at the end of the Napoleonic regime were mostly 
discontinued after 1814.
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 Apart from for a few isolated years, this valuable source simply 






However, the restoration does yield another source that Napoleonic censorship had previously made 
almost invisible – a relatively free press. The charter of 1814 guaranteed the French people liberty 
of expression ‘in conformity with the laws necessary to repress its abuses.’ In attempting to strike 
this balance, successive ministries passed a bewildering variety of laws, some of which temporarily 
re-established censorship. This was, however, a significant improvement on the stifling regulation 
that Napoleon had imposed. The last period of restoration censorship, introduced by the law of 16
th
 
August 1824, ended just six weeks later when Charles X restored press freedom on his accession to 
the throne.
16
 The years in which France shifted to a forward foreign policy also witnessed a 
dramatic revival of public debate and polemic. 
 
At the forefront of this was the periodical press. This was mostly Paris-based, and since it 
functioned by individual subscription which was relatively expensive, its formal circulation 
probably did not exceed 60,000. However, it reached a much wider audience than this, via 
aristocratic salons, public reading rooms, or cafés. One Paris prefect of police estimated that a 
single copy of the popular liberal newspaper, Le Constitutionnel, was read by a hundred people.
17
 If 
this is correct, given that Le Constitutionnel had 16,250 official subscribers in 1824, then its real 
circulation was 160,000. Its main rival in terms of readership was the Journal des débats, with 
13,000 subscribers. Founded in 1799 by the Bertin brothers and still owned by them in the 1820s, 
its political position oscillated between ultra and more measured royalism, and its most important 
contributor was Chateaubriand himself. Less powerful, but still influential, were the firmly ultra La 
Quotidienne with 5800 subscribers, the moderate royalist Journal de Paris with 4175, and the 
liberal Courrier Français  and  Journal du Commerce with 3,000 and 2380 apiece.
18
 Analysing 
opinion through the press can never be an exact science, but if one takes a cross-section through Le 




represented liberalism, moderate and ultra-royalism respectively, one gains some idea of what the 
French public thought about France’s changing diplomatic direction after 1823. 
 
This analysis supports the assumption that a forward foreign policy had popular appeal. Every time 
the possibility of France revising the Vienna settlement came before the public in this period, both 
the Journal des débats and Le Constitutionnel swung in support of it. The former’s stance is hardly 
surprising, since Chateaubriand wrote many of its editorials, but Le Constitutionnel was if anything 
more vociferous, since the ‘natural frontiers’ formed part of the revolutionary legacy it upheld. 
Conversely, the ultra La Quotidienne condemned a forward policy and the ‘natural frontiers’, 
precisely because of their revolutionary associations. Yet compared with the Journal des Débats and 
Le Constitutionnel, which accounted for half of formal press circulation and were most diffused 
among the non-subscribing public, La Quotidienne was in a distinct minority. 
 
The Spanish expedition was in large part an attempt to harness these forces and exploit them to 
improve the restoration’s domestic standing. It is no coincidence that Chateaubriand, who became 
foreign minister just months before it was launched, was its chief promoter. As a journalist, he 
immediately grasped how the invasion could popularize the regime. It was, as he put it to Villèle, 
‘perhaps a unique occasion to restore France to the ranks of the military powers and to rehabilitate 
the white cockade through a short war that presents almost no dangers.’ Once victory was gained, 
he stressed its internal benefits with his usual hyperbole: ‘Twenty days of war have done more to 




Restoring some of France’s prestige and proving the army’s loyalty was just the first step in 
Chateaubriand’s foreign policy; the next was to regain as much of the natural frontiers as possible. 
The success of the Spanish expedition proved to him that this was feasible. ‘From then on’, he 




force, the odious Vienna settlement.’ At this stage, however, he was well aware of the need for 
caution: ‘This notion at the back of my mind, which I secretly cherished as a corollary of our 





The problem was that Chateaubriand’s days in government were numbered. Villèle had only 
reluctantly agreed to the invasion of Spain, and now feared that his foreign minister might become a 
rival for his job.
21
 The expedition’s success further inflated Chateaubriand’s habitual self-
importance, making him an increasingly difficult colleague. By the summer of 1824 Villèle had 
decided to get rid of him, and his refusal to support a government bill for the conversion of 
annuities provided an excuse to do so. In fact, on this issue Chateaubriand’s political instinct was 
surer than Villèle’s, since the conversion, whose profits were earmarked for an eventual indemnity 




 June Chateaubriand received a 
particularly brutal letter of dismissal, and two hours later, in a fury, moved out of the foreign 
ministry. With his departure, the cause of a forward foreign policy lost its most prominent supporter 
in government, but it did not fade from the political scene. Another international issue had now 
arisen that, even more than the Spanish question, offered it a rallying-point: the Greek revolt. 
 
Since 1821, the Greeks had been in rebellion against their Ottoman overlords.
23
 The conflict was 
long-drawn out, bitter and extremely bloody. Both sides committed dreadful atrocities, but those 
carried out by the Turks received most publicity. The result was a strong philhellene movement in 
public opinion, based in part on concern for suffering fellow-Christians, and also on a Romantic 
sensibility that venerated the ancient Greeks and admired the heroism of their modern descendants. 
Largely thanks to Byron, the most famous examples of this philhellenism are British, but it was also 
very strong in France. The Greek struggle inspired Hugo, Vigny and Delacroix, while in 1825 




philhellène, and in the same year provided it with a manifesto in the form of his Note sur la Grèce.  
The press also strongly supported the Greek cause; it has been calculated that in 1824, of the 60,000 
French newspapers in circulation 40,000 belonged to the philhellene camp, and only 8,000 to their 
opponents’.
24
 If the Greeks’ war of independence could be made to serve a French forward policy, 
this clearly had support in the political nation. 
 
Yet the key opportunity the Greek revolt offered this strategy lay not in the rising itself, but in its 
international repercussions. As the traditional protector of Orthodox Christians, Russia had an 
obvious excuse to intervene. She had a further pretext for hostilities against the Ottomans, since 
they had not fulfilled their obligations under the treaty of Bucharest, which had ended the last 
Russo-Turkish war in 1812. If Russia did go to war, this was bound to revive Catherine the Great’s 
old project of partitioning the Ottoman empire. This prospect offered the best hope for a French 
forward policy. If France supported Russia’s ambitions in the east, she could demand as a quid pro 
quo territorial gains in the west, preferably Belgium or the Rhineland. Alone, she had no hope of 
extending her borders; the Greek revolt, by tempting Russia to overturn the status quo in the 




At this stage, the idea was expressed only in hints and loose talk. On one occasion, however, it may 
have been explored at an international level. In Le Congrès de Vérone, his account of his mission in 
1822 to the congress of Verona, Chateaubriand hints that by then Czar Alexander I had come to feel 
that France had been treated too harshly in 1815, and now supported rectifying this.
26
 He gave no 
further details in his memoir, but may have done so elsewhere. Five years after Verona, Le 
Constitutionnel carried an editorial claiming that at the congress the Czar, increasingly tempted to 
use the Greek question as a casus belli with Turkey, had made a proposal to one of the French 
representatives there, who could only have been Chateaubriand. In exchange for France’s armed 




make her one of the greatest and most influential powers in the world.’
27
 Yet Villèle, alarmed by 
such a bold idea, had ‘ruined the project.’ Clearly the story is second-hand, and Chateaubriand may 
well have embroidered it, but it probably reflects some of the notions circulating at the time. 
 
Had Chateaubriand continued as foreign minister, these expansionist plans would no doubt have 
come to the fore, and shaped the second stage of his foreign policy. His abrupt dismissal, however, 
postponed them for almost four years. For Villèle, now in unrivalled charge of the ministry, the 
Greek question was an international crisis to be resolved rather than an opportunity to be exploited. 
In July 1827, his government signed the treaty of London committing Russia, Britain and France to 
impose Greek autonomy on the Turks by force if necessary. Three years after the Spanish 
expedition, France was appearing again on the world stage, but this time she was happy to be 
chaperoned. A French squadron formed part of the allied fleet that destroyed the Turks at Navarino 
the following October and sealed Greek independence, but a British admiral was in overall 
command, and apart from the Greeks the main beneficiary was Russia. Yet at this moment, 
unexpectedly, prospects for a forward foreign policy revived. Facing mounting domestic opposition, 
Villèle called a general election, lost his majority
28
, and a change of ministry became inevitable.  
 
The new government was formed in January 1828 and led by the comte de Martignac.
29
 It is usually 
viewed simply as an interlude between the fall of Villèle and the July revolution, plagued by 
hesitations and contradictions in its domestic policy. This judgement can be questioned, and 
certainly does not apply to foreign affairs. Here, the ministry’s twenty months in office marked the 
apogee of France’s forward policy. Paradoxically, this did not involve Chateaubriand’s return to 
government. Even after his fall, Villèle still enjoyed credit with King Charles X, who had succeeded 
Louis XVIII in September 1824, and he used it to block his rival.
30
 The new foreign minister was a 
respected career diplomat, the comte de la Ferronnays. Yet la Ferronnays was also a close friend of 




Vienna settlement. Furthermore, he knew Russia well, having been ambassador to St Petersburg for 
seven years before entering the ministry. Accepting the gilded consolation prize of the Rome 
embassy, Chateaubriand wrote to him: ‘I am only an ambassador because you are a minister’,
31
 and 
from his Roman retreat exerted a powerful influence on the new government. The foreign ministry 
remained beyond Chateaubriand’s reach, but he played a critical part in shaping its actions. 
 
A further sign that France had changed diplomatic direction was the choice of la Ferronnays’ 
replacement as French ambassador to Russia. The duc de Mortemart was the head of a leading 
noble family and a distinguished soldier, who had served Napoleon before rallying to the restored 
Bourbons. He was also a close friend of la Ferronnays, and strongly supported the plan of revising 
the Vienna settlement in partnership with Russia.
32
 His correspondence with la Ferronnays during 
his embassy, much of which remains unstudied, forms the most complete record of the efforts to 
implement a scheme, which its promoters, rightly or wrongly, felt to be on the brink of success in 
1828 and 1829. 
 
Mortemart’s role in the project was crucial. As delicately as possible, he was to raise with the new 
Czar, Nicholas I, the eventuality of the collapse of the Ottoman empire, and assure Nicholas of full 
French support for whatever actions he took in response.
33
 The subtext was obvious: France was 
offering Russia a free hand in the east, no doubt in exchange for territorial concessions in the west. 
Then, just as Mortemart was setting off on his mission, a major piece of news brought this prospect 
a long step closer. Citing Turkish violations of her treaty rights in the Balkans, Russia declared war 
on the Ottoman empire. Mortemart immediately altered his travel plans. Instead of proceeding 
directly to St Petersburg, he decided to head first to Bender in Bessarabia, where the Czar was 




Mortemart had his first meeting with Nicholas I on 26
th




was as much about French public opinion as the progress of the war. The Czar said that he found 
this ‘detestable’; he had been reading the most recent French newspapers and been horrified by their 
seditious tone. ‘Does the king no longer rule?’, he asked rhetorically. Mortemart riposted that while 
Villèle had been unpopular, the new ministers were greatly respected: ‘Far from being concerned 
about public opinion in France, I am certain that right now, if his honour required it, the king could 
ask the chambers for a billion francs and 500,000 men, and that this would immediately be 
granted.’
35
 The exchange reveals a great deal about each man’s conception of public opinion: for the 
reactionary Nicholas, it was indissolubly linked to revolution, while to the more pragmatic 
Mortemart, it could be tempted into government service.  
 
A few weeks later Mortemart received his first despatch from la Ferronnays, dated 9
th
 June. It 
enclosed a document on which the ministry was to build its hopes for over a year. This was a copy 
of another despatch, from the Russian foreign minister Nesselrode to his veteran ambassador in 
Paris Count Pozzo di Borgo, who had passed it on to la Ferronnays. In it, Nesselrode gave an 
assurance that if France supported Russia in her war against the Ottomans, she would receive her 
share of the spoils. ‘The more energy and activity France displays in the affairs of the Levant’, he 
wrote, ‘…..the more Russia will feel obliged to insist that she shares the fruits as well as the perils 




For la Ferronnays, the prize seemed tantalizingly within reach. At the same time, he was terrified it 
might be withdrawn if snatched at too quickly. He assumed that if the Ottoman empire were 
partitioned, Austria would be compensated with Serbia and Bosnia, and Britain with some 
Mediterranean islands. However, underlining just how thorny the issue of France extending her own 
borders was after 1815, Mortemart was to broach it with extreme caution. ‘In order for us to gauge 
what expectations we should form’, wrote la Ferronnays,  
It would be useful to know the Russian cabinet’s thoughts, and I beg you, M le duc, to try and find 




and in the most profound secret. You should try to bring the conversation round to the subject 






In the private letter which accompanied the despatch, la Ferronnays set out France’s aims much 
more forthrightly. If the Ottoman empire survived, France would accept this as necessary for the 
peace of Europe, but if not, it would be intolerable if other powers benefited and she did not. In a 
remarkable outburst, revealing the deep sense of grievance French statesmen felt against the Vienna 
settlement, he even threatened war if France was excluded: 
In that case the only solution would be a general congress in which Russia would undertake to 
support France’s just and moderate claims. If things were otherwise, we would have no hestitation 
in resorting to other, much more dangerous, means ……We desire peace in good faith, we do not 
complain at the status quo, even though, relatively speaking, it is so unfair to us, but if the status 
quo is upended, ventre saint gris!!
38
 I swear by my beard that this will not go unpunished. We only 
need to press a button to conjure up legions of soldiers, and I assure you that, given the current 





In the background of the despatch appeared a figure who was to play an increasing role in France’s 
expansionist strategy – King Charles X himself. La Ferronnays made a point of telling Mortemart 
that Charles had been ‘extremely touched’ by Nesselrode’s words about France sharing the fruits as 
well as the perils of her intervention in the Levant, which he assumed had been inspired by the Czar. 
The instructions to explore them further with both Nicholas and Nesselrode were presented as a 
direct order from the king. This would have come as no surprise to Mortemart. Charles was 
significantly less prudent – and intelligent – than Louis XVIII, and much more inclined to sabre-
rattling diplomacy.
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 Now deeply devout after a libertine youth, he was much moved by the 
sufferings of his fellow-Christians in Greece, and as early as 1826 had hinted to the British foreign 
minister Canning that he was prepared to use force to help them.
41
 Partnership with Russia for 
territorial gain was as much the king’s own policy as his ministers’. 
 
By this time French public opinion had awoken to the opportunities offered by the Russo-Turkish 
war. On 29
th




impassioned plea for France’s natural frontiers, but artfully phrased to cause the least possible alarm 
to her neighbours. Advancing to the Rhine was presented not as an act of aggression, but as a basic 
French security need. Otherwise, Paris itself was vulnerable, as had been proved at the start of the 
revolutionary war when Austrian and Prussian forces had seriously threatened it: 
To defend ourselves, we had to conquer. Victory led us to the summit of the Alps and the left bank 
of the Rhine, necessary barriers for resisting the enemy’s attacks, and France’s natural limits. This 





These conclusions, the article argued, still held good thirty years later, particularly if the Ottoman 
empire were indeed partitioned and other powers gained territories as a result. In that case, France 
should not be tempted by any exotic overseas possessions that might be dangled in front of her as 
her own share, but look to her own frontiers: 
France seeks neither advantages nor compensations, either in the Peleponnese, or even in Egypt. If 
the balance of power is disturbed, her only means of assuring her defence and independence will be 





Here was evidence that the ministry’s forward policy did indeed chime with the public mood. Now 
all depended on Mortemart’s skill in insinuating to the Czar, ‘as the result of his own reflections’, 
what would be the most helpful territorial reward for France endorsing the end of the Ottoman 
empire. Mortemart’s next despatch set out, in considerable detail, how he intended to do this. As an 
ex-cavalry officer, his preference was to broach the subject with the Czar during a horseback ride: ‘I 
will then be much more in my element, more informal and at ease.’
44
 However, it soon became 
clear that the conversation would have to be postponed. The Russian army, which all observers had 
assumed would swiftly crush the Turks, instead ground to a halt. Nicholas and his generals had been 
overconfident, and had not concentrated sufficient troops and supplies for the task at hand, 
particularly when they were forced to lay siege to three key, fiercely-defended fortresses, Varna, 
Silistria and Shumla.
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 If the Russian military machine was stalling, then the assumptions behind 





La Ferronnays’ reaction to this unwelcome news betrayed a whiff of panic. On the 30
th
 July, he 
confessed to Mortemart that it was impossible not to be alarmed at the consequences of the Russian 
reverses. From talk of raising legions of soldiers, he now performed a complete about -face, and 
pressed Mortemart to urge the Czar to make peace as soon as possible: ‘In heaven’s name, I beg 
you, persuade the emperor to settle for the glory he has already acquired, and to add to it through 




La Ferronnays’ sudden collapse in confidence reveals surprising volatility in such an experienced 
statesman. In fact, his health was buckling under the strain of the crisis. ‘My health is so ruined’, he 
confessed to Mortemart, ‘that I can no longer go on.’ The king, he continued, had ordered him to go 
and take the waters for two months, during which time the under-secretary of state, Rayneval, 
would replace him. However, Mortemart should continue to send him confidential letters detailing 




This left Mortemart, now in Odessa, fighting to salvage a policy in which he still believed. In his 
reply, he conceded that the immediate prospect of the Ottomans’ demise had receded: ‘the partition 
of Turkey is a project for the future.’
48
 However, France had too much at stake in the eastern 
Mediterranean to withdraw now. This argument had particular force since a further factor had 
intervened. Over the last weeks la Ferronnays had secured Russian and British consent to the 
despatch of a French expeditionary force of 15,000 men to supervise the evacuation of the 
remaining Ottoman forces from the Morea, their last base in southern Greece. This was clearly good 
for national prestige, and a military success would strengthen France’s claims when the Ottoman 
empire did – and Mortemart remained convinced that it would – eventually collapse. If the Czar, on 
French advice, made peace prematurely, the Morea expedition, and all its potential strategic 





We need a resounding success in the Morea, as an example of what we could achieve, if necessary, 
with all our forces. Our military reputation, which stands high at the moment, will one day, and at 





In fact, Mortemart need not have worried. Although he did not know, it, by the time he was writing 
the Morea expedition had already set sail from Toulon, making the policy reversal he feared much 
less likely. The next month came an even more important development. Showing la Ferronnays’ 
fears to have been groundless, the Czar decided to continue the war against the Turks come what 
may, and to launch a second campaign in the following spring. With Russia mobilizing her 
resources to make certain of victory this time, the international outlook changed once more. After 
its brief resurgence, the Ottoman empire was once more in mortal danger, and the spoils France 
might claim from this were again within reach.  
 
At this point, Charles X made a revealing decision. He announced that he would make an official 
tour of France’s eastern provinces, Champagne, Alsace and Lorraine, in the first three weeks of 
September. At first sight, this may not seem particularly remarkable; the king had made similar 
excursions to other parts of France in previous years. However, at a moment when he was taking 
both his domestic and his foreign policy in a visibly new direction, it is hard not to see this latest 
progress as symbolic. Having just installed a liberal ministry under Martignac, he was now visiting 
a region viewed as dangerously radical by Martignac’s predecessor Villèle, who had virtually barred 
its leading citizens from public office. Having lost more territory in 1815 than anywhere else in 
France, the eastern departments were also likely to greet the new forward foreign policy with 
enthusiasm. Looked at in detail, the king’s journey appears a carefully choreographed endorsement 




It is clear that this message was understood, and heartily approved, by the greater part of the French 




coverage to the royal progress. Ten days into the king’s tour, in a long editorial, it noted the 
enthusiasm with which he had been greeted everywhere, and unhesitatingly ascribed it to delight at 
the replacement of Villèle by sincerely constitutional ministers: ‘The mass of citizens, of all ages 
and classes, who flocked from everywhere to greet His Majesty, wished to demonstrate by their 
enthusiasm their gratitude to the prince who has received, and is keeping intact, the gift of the 
Charter.’
51
 The point was emphasized by an illuminated display at Strasbourg, when no less a figure 
than Benjamin Constant raised a curtain to reveal a recumbent woman representing Alsace, with the 




References to foreign policy in the king’s programme were less explicit, but nonetheless not hard to 
discern. They were most obvious at Strasbourg, France’s prize possession on the Rhine and the 
culmination of the tour. At 1.30pm on 7
th
 September, Charles entered the city on horseback through 
a triumphal arch to a 101-gun salute, the ringing of the cathedral bells, and a welcome from the 
inhabitants whose enthusiasm was ‘impossible to describe.’ That evening, the presence at dinner of 
the king of Wűrttemberg, the grand duke of Baden, and an envoy of the king of Bavaria recalled the 
heady days of Louis XIV, when France had dominated southern Germany. The next day was 
devoted to military manoeuvres, whose high point came when a flotilla of twelve boats ferried 350 
infantry and artillerymen from the French to the German bank of the Rhine under covering fire. The 
grand duke of Baden and his brothers, whose territory lay directly on the border, apparently 




Glory and conquest were evoked the following day as well, when Charles made a halt in the village 
of Altkirch, where a previous treaty extending France’s eastern frontier had been signed. His next 
stop, the town of Huningue, held less happy memories: all its fortifications had been demolished in 
1815. The king was presented with a petition lamenting the fact, to which he returned a suitably 








Such anodyne phrases failed to reflect Charles’ real state of mind. He was overwhelmed by the 
enthusiasm that greeted him everywhere in Alsace and Lorraine, and this encouraged him to warlike 
plans. Specifically, he thought it probable that Austria would be dragged into the Russo-Turkish 
conflict, allowing France to aid Russia in exchange for revisions to the Vienna settlement. The 
patriotic fervour he had just witnessed convinced him that this course would be popular. The king 
confided these speculations to Martignac: 
If the Emperor Nicholas attacks Austria, I shall hold back and wait on events. But if Austria attacks, 
I will immediately march against her. Perhaps a war against the Viennese court will be of use to me, 




It was in this febrile atmosphere that la Ferronnays returned to Paris from taking the waters. 
Revealingly, one of his first actions was to commission from Chateaubriand in Rome a 
memorandum on the opportunities the Russo-Turkish war offered France.
56
 This was completed and 
sent to him on 30
th
 November. Chateaubriand was sufficiently proud of it to publish it later in the 
Mémoires d’outre-tombe, and it remains the most comprehensive and powerful exposition of French 
forward policy in the 1820s. It began by rehearsing the arguments in favour of a Franco-Russian 
alliance: of the major powers, Britain and Austria were committed to upholding the Vienna 
settlement, whereas Russia, tempted by expansion herself, would be more likely to condone 
France’s ambitions. Chateaubriand also set out quite specifically what territorial gains France had in 
mind as the price for supporting Russia: ‘our aim is the Rhine frontier, from Strasbourg to  
Cologne.’
57
 This was a very ambitious goal, involving the cession to France not only of the 
Prussian-ruled Rhineland, but conceivably also of eastern Belgium, then part of the kingdom of the 
Netherlands. However, the Czar was both the son-in-law of the King of Prussia and the brother-in-
law of the Crown Prince of the Netherlands, and thus able to exert influence on his relatives to trade 





The next months, from the winter of 1828 to the summer of 1829, marked the high water mark of 
the restoration’s forward foreign policy. In the major capitals of Europe, French diplomats worked 
feverishly to further it. They were encouraged in this by the first good news to emerge from the 
campaign in the Balkans – on 29
th
 September, Varna capitulated to the Russians. His personal 
prestige restored, Nicholas I returned to St Petersburg. The focus of French efforts, however, now 
shifted away from the Czar and his ministers, to the Prussian government in Berlin. This made clear 
logical sense: if France’s borders were to advance east, then Prussia would have to be persuaded to 
relinquish the Rhineland, her major gain from 1815. The comte d’Agoult, Charles X’s shrewd and 
experienced ambassador to Berlin, set to work on this task. In March 1829, he sent a long 
memorandum analysing Prussia’s situation to Paris. This was passed on to the king, who read and 
approved it.
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 D’Agoult argued that Prussia’s current geography was far from ideal: ‘[she] still 
needs to round off her possessions, and fortify herself.’
59
 The obvious solution was for her to 
exchange the Rhineland, which was far to the west of her heartland, for Saxony, which would make 
her territory far more compact. In fact, this idea had some pedigree, since the acquisition of Saxony 
had been Prussia’s original preference at the congress of Vienna. 
 
On this basis, France’s aim was to construct an alliance between France, Prussia and Russia. Its first 
purpose would be to help Russia win her war against the Turks. The pact did not need to be formal; 
if Britain and Austria tried to intervene to save the Ottomans, a simple declaration of neutrality by 
France and Prussia would dissuade them from war. A grateful Russia would then ensure that her 
allies were suitably rewarded – no doubt with the Rhineland and Saxony. However, tempting the 
highly conservative and risk-averse King Frederick William III of Prussia and his equally cautious 
foreign minister Count Bernstorff onto such a bold course was no simple matter. D’Agoult exerted 
his powers of persuasion on Bernstorff, while Mortemart made a special detour to Berlin on his way 







Three weeks later the prospects for the new alliance improved dramatically. It was announced that 
the Czar would travel to Berlin in June for the wedding of his brother-in-law, Prince Wilhelm of 
Prussia. In the French government and press, expectations mounted that Nicholas would use this 
opportunity to remove his Prussian relatives’ last hesitations about joining the Franco-Russian pact. 
The second campaign in the Balkans was about to open, and with luck would shortly yield Russian 
victories to reinforce his arguments. The stakes were high, since Turkey’s collapse could spark a 
European war, but France had everything to play for. As the Journal des débats put it: ‘An 
unprecedented conflagration is looming, and the smallest spark could set it off!......No power has 




La Ferronnays, however, would play no part in this dénouement. Just three months after returning to 
work, he had a stroke and collapsed in his office, making a permanent replacement necessary.
62
 The 
moment seemed tailor-made for Chateaubriand’s return, but an obstacle was soon apparent. During 
La Ferronnays’ first illness Charles X had acquired a taste for being his own foreign minister. In 
September and October, even during his tour of the eastern departments, he was corresponding with 
la Ferronnays’ deputy about the Russo-Turkish war, firing off notes on such subjects as the blockade 
of the Dardanelles.
63
 The king wanted less a foreign minister than a subordinate director of foreign 
policy, who shared all his political views and knew when to bow to his will. On none of these 
grounds did Chateaubriand qualify for the situation.  
 
In contrast, there was one political figure who did: Prince Jules de Polignac, the French ambassador 
to London. An old and close friend of Charles X, Polignac was an extreme ultra-royalist, whose 
devout Catholicism bordered on mysticism. However, he was far too conservative to be acceptable 
to Martignac, so a new ministry would have to be constructed around him, and this would take 
time.
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 Meanwhile, pressure from Chateaubriand’s advocates inside and outside the government had 




Neuville urged Chateaubriand’s recall, he replied: ‘I’m not saying no, I’m very attached to him, I 
know he could be very useful to me.’ The existing ministers were split. If appointed, Chateaubriand 
would be an overbearing colleague; if not, he would probably defect – along with the significant 
group of deputies loyal to him – to the opposition. As La Quotidienne put it: ‘They have decided 




In April 1829 Charles X revealed his hand. Until Polignac was ready, an interim foreign minister 
was necessary, so the king chose the pliable duc de Laval, currently French ambassador to Vienna. 
This was a calculated snub to Chateaubriand, whose reaction was to set off from Rome to Paris to 
resign his embassy in person. The sequel was a comedy of errors. Chateaubriand arrived in Paris to 
find that Laval had just returned from Vienna, having not accepted, but refused, the foreign 
ministry. The position was once again vacant, but it swiftly became clear the king would not relent – 
he gave Chateaubriand an audience, but only to ask when he was travelling back to Rome.
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Chateaubriand prepared to do so, but not before taking two steps that underline how critical he 
thought the juncture was, and how much he wanted to play his part in it. The first was to leave a 
letter at the foreign ministry on the day of his departure, asking that if an international congress was 
called to end the Russo-Turkish war and resolve the Eastern Question, he should be chosen as the 
French plenipotentiary.
67
 Six years on, he was hoping to reprise, with even greater effect, his role at 
the congress of Verona. 
 
Chateaubriand’s second step was taken in the open, and aimed at the wider political world and 
public opinion. On 16
th
 June he rose in the chamber of peers to support the granting of extra credits 
to the foreign ministry.  From this point of departure he launched into a much more wide-ranging 
speech. On one level, it was a powerful expression of his vision of a France allying domestic liberty 
to an assertive foreign policy. On another, it was a warning that if in the near future the Ottoman 




Diminished when other powers expanded, France lost her colonies, her conquests and even part of 
her former territory; in exchange she receive her rightful princes and the Charter, and she has gladly 
accepted this outcome ……But if events as unexpected as they are improbable should force us to 
change this attitude to preserve the benefits of peace, is not Charles X surrounded by a valiant and 
devoted nation?......New means of success are at hand in the institutions given us by our 





In fact, though Chateaubriand did not know it, the crisis he anticipated had broken five days before. 
On 11
th
 June, d’Agoult had a vital interview with Nicholas I, who had now arrived in Berlin. He had 
assumed that this would set the seal on the new pact between France, Russia and Prussia. Instead 
the Czar, visibly ill at ease, talked only of France’s internal problems and his doubts that 
Martignac’s ministry would survive. This was a repeat of the tactic Mortemart had noted, implying 
that France was too divided and turbulent to make a reliable ally. Baffled, d’Agoult sought an 
explanation from Bernstorff, and found to his fury that he had been duped. Distracted by severe 
gout, Bernstorff let slip that Austria, alarmed by France’s overtures to Russia and Prussia, had 
secretly made a counter-proposal to St Petersburg and Berlin: a negotiated end to the war in the 
Balkans, the preservation of the Ottoman empire, and close co-operation against France, where 





Relaying this news, d’Agoult pointed out that  his colleague in St Petersburg was now best placed to 
undo the damage inflicted by Austria, through speaking privately with the Czar on his return. 
Instructions to this effect, reflecting Charles X’s deep concern, were soon on their way from the 
foreign ministry to Mortemart: ‘you can imagine that His Majesty is very impatient to know the 




 August, at the military 
camp at Krasnoe Selo, the ambassador managed to engineer the moment on horseback he had first 
planned the previous year. It began well; when Mortemart raised Austria’s insinuation that France 
was on the brink of revolution, the Czar reined in his horse next to his, and ‘boot to boot’, assured 






   
 
Emboldened by the Czar’s words, Mortemart warmed to his anti-Austrian theme. His focus, 
however, was not her manoeuvres in Berlin or defence of the Ottomans, but her apparent attempt to 
gain control of France’s Italian neighbour Piedmont. He then took the critical step, and broached the 
taboo subject of revising the Vienna settlement. If Austria continued her incursions, he asserted, 
France would go to war with her ‘to gain…..compensation for her sacrifices of 1815’. Immediately 
he realized he had gone too far. ‘For the love of God’, the Czar burst out, ‘don’t do that, you’ll set 
all Europe aflame; we need peace so much!’
72
   
 
 
This was the moment when the dreams of Charles X and Chateaubriand were dispelled by the most 
powerful man in the world. At this decisive juncture, forced to choose between territorial gain at the 
risk of a European conflict and the more prosaic stability offered by the Vienna settlement, the Czar 
was opting for the latter. To d’Agoult in Berlin, and Mortemart in Bender and Krasnoe Selo, 
Nicholas consistently made it clear that his prime concern was the international revolutionary 
menace, to which France was especially susceptible, and which would only increase if the Russo-
Turkish war extended to the other powers. He was grateful for France’s diplomatic support against 
the Turks, and happy in return to make general promises of Russia’s friendship and good offices, 
but refused to undermine the foundations of the continental status quo. One suspects that 
Mortemart, who genuinely believed in a Franco-Russian alliance to expand the territory of both 
countries, did not sufficiently appreciate this fact. 
 
Yet this might not be the whole story. Nicholas I’s ultimate views on the Eastern Question remain 
controversial. Throughout his reign the Czar was suspected by the other powers of wishing to 




Crimean war. Historians now generally accept that Nicholas preferred to keep Turkey in an 
enfeebled state, overshadowed by Russian might, rather than destroy her completely.
73
 Yet it is rare 
for rulers and statesmen never to contemplate an alternative to their chosen policies, and in this case 
the alternative, partitioning the Ottoman empire, was obvious and tempting. While concluding that 
the summer of 1829 was not the right moment to take this course, it is quite possible that the Czar 
kept it in reserve to use if circumstances changed. Even after his rebuff in Berlin, d’Agoult thought 
the Franco-Prussian-Russian alliance was still a possibility, and he was a shrewd observer. The 
Austrian plan that had momentarily scotched it was still ‘extremely vague’, he noted, ‘[and] is 




What is clear is that d’Agoult’s and Mortemart’s meetings with the Czar marked the furthest point 
the restoration monarchy reached in implementing its forward policy. This gives a new perspective 
on its final attempt to revive it before the July revolution, the so-called ‘Polignac project.’ On 8
th
 
August, just a day before Mortemart’s horseback conversation with Nicholas I, Charles X finally 
executed his cherished plan of dismissing Martignac and replacing him as prime minister by Jules 
de Polignac. By now, the tide of war in the Balkans had at last turned in Russia’s favour. Under 
new, more effective generalship the Russian army took Silistria, circumvented Shumla and marched 
straight across the Balkan mountains for Constantinople. With the end of the Ottoman empire 
seeming imminent, Polignac commissioned from the head of the foreign ministry’s political section, 
the comte de Boislecomte, a formal proposal for partitioning Turkey and redrawing the Vienna 
settlement, to be sent to Mortemart for presentation to Nicholas I.
75
   
 
The ‘Polignac project’ was, to say the least, wide-ranging. Under its terms, Russia would gain the 
Danubian principalities in the Balkans she was already occupying, and a large slice of Turkish Asia 
Minor around Armenia and the Caucasus. France, for her part would take Belgium. Around this 




Russian, but instead the capital of a new greater Greece. Prussia would lose the Rhineland, which 
would become an independent buffer state, but receive in return Holland and Saxony. The King of 
the Netherlands would be compensated for the loss of his kingdom with the unlooked-for honour of 
ruling the new Greek state. 
 
Containing as it does so many visionary ideas in a single document, the Polignac project is by far 
the best known example of France’s forward policy in the late 1820s.
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 As a result, it has entirely 
eclipsed the diplomatic efforts that preceded it. Yet as Bertier de Sauvigny has pointed out, it was 
merely a ‘clumsy copy’ of the ideas and policies of Chateaubriand and la Ferronnays.
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Chateaubriand’s aim of a Rhine frontier from Strasbourg to Cologne was extremely ambitious, but 
the triple alliance designed to achieve it was at least a practical possibility. In contrast, Polignac’s 
literally Byzantine plans for Greece and scheme for an independent Rhineland smacked of fantasy. 
Above all, his substitution of Belgium for the Rhine as France’s goal would unquestionably have 
involved her in war with the one global superpower of the day, Britain, which had just successfully 
fought a twenty-two year war to prevent her absorbing the Low Countries. 
 
As it turned out, the Polignac project was over before it had begun. It was sent to Mortemart on 4
th
 
September 1829; on the 14
th
, before it had even arrived, Russia and Turkey signed a peace treaty at 
Adrianople. Russia contented herself with strategic and commercial rather than territorial gains – 
the Danube delta, enclaves on the eastern Black Sea, and access to the Mediterranean for Russian 
shipping. A small independent Greece – a far cry from Polignac’s grand vision – was also created. 
Mortemart realized immediately that, for the moment at least, Adrianople fatally compromised 
France’s forward policy in Europe, and when he did receive Polignac’s proposal decided not to raise 
it with the Czar.
78






In one sense, however, the restoration’s forward policy did not end in 1829, but simply shifted away 
from Europe. Within months of the news of Adrianople, Polignac’s ministry began planning a 
military expedition to conquer Algiers. France did in fact have a casus belli; the city’s ruler, the Dey 
Hussein, had recently insulted the French consul in the course of a commercial dispute, and 
Algerian pirates were a menace to all European shipping in the Mediterranean. But it is also clear 
that, once again, Charles X and his ministers were hoping for a military victory to burnish the 
régime’s laurels and appeal to public opinion.
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 There were other continuities. The Dey Hussein was 
nominally a vassal of the Ottoman sultan, and the French government made sure of Russian support 
before implementing its plans. As Karl Hammer observes, one aim of the Algerian expedition may 





The French forces disembarked before Algiers on 14
th
 June 1830, and three weeks later had 
captured the city. Yet the victory dividend the king and his ministers expected did not materialize. 
This may have been because extra-European conquests did not arouse the same enthusiasm as 
European ones to a French public reared on the Napoleonic legend. Certainly the capture of Algiers 
was insufficient to disarm the growing opposition to Charles and Polignac, who were increasingly 
suspected of plotting an authoritarian coup d’état at home. The Journal des débats and 
Constitutionnel, which had so ardently supported a forward European policy, were both distinctly 
tepid about the news from North Africa. Neither would allow Polignac any credit for the 
expedition’s military achievement. The Journal des débats commented sourly: ‘The capture of 
Algiers cannot be made a party-political victory, and this public triumph must not be confiscated by 
a faction.’ To exploit the victory properly, added Le Constitutionnel, ‘we need a government that 
can march in step with France.’
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 As for the public, the lack of the usual rejoicing at the 
thanksgiving Te Deum held at Notre-Dame made an impression even on the king; during the 







The contrast between this depressing occasion and the joyful scenes at Strasbourg less than two 
years earlier is revealing. In September 1828, Charles X had just appointed a relatively liberal 
ministry committed at home to upholding the Charter and abroad to retrieving France’s position in 
Europe. In July 1830, he was backing a ministry that hoped a North African victory abroad would 
legitimize an attack on the Charter at home. Of course, one should not read too much into these 
public demonstrations; how far the crowds who flocked to the king in Alsace were expressing 
approval of his ministers’ domestic or foreign policy, or simply enjoying a day out watching mock 
battles on the Rhine, can never be known. Yet the genuine, and victorious, battle of Algiers was 
greeted only with ‘dejection and silence.’ Its misfortune was to have been planned by an unpopular 
government, and fought on a distant shore. 
 
A fortnight after the Te Deum at Notre-Dame, the Parisians took to the streets for another purpose, 
to resist the government’s long-anticipated coup d’état. Within two days the king’s troops had been 
put to flight. Whether the outcome would have been different had they been reinforced by the 
40,000 soldiers currently in Algiers is an open question. On 2
nd
 August, Charles X abdicated. One 
of his last acts as king was to appoint the duc de Mortemart, recently returned from St Petersburg, 
as prime minister with powers to make sweeping concessions to save the throne. Two days later 
Mortemart realized the task was impossible, resigned, and after a decent interval rallied to the new 




The Bourbons’ forward policy of the 1820s was never likely to achieve its goals. Regaining 
territories lost by Napoleon, in face of the suspicion and hostility of all the major powers, was a 
near-impossible undertaking. The ingenious idea of supporting Russian ambitions in the east to 
extend France’s borders in the west was ultimately too complicated to succeed, though it did come 




is less important than what it says about French policymakers and public opinion at the time. 
Contrary to the traditional picture, the restoration monarchy was acutely aware of its association 
with national defeat and prepared to go to considerable, even dangerous, lengths to erase it. In 1829, 
the prospect of a Russian alliance led Charles X to contemplate European war. Had he still been in 
power in August 1830, the temptations offered by the Belgian revolution might have pushed him 
even further. In that sense, although an acute domestic upheaval, his fall actually advanced 
international peace. For the next eighteen years, Charles’s successor Louis-Philippe steered clear of 
major continental conflict, often in defiance of press and popular agitation. France’s next challenge 
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